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18
SOME UNEXAMINED ASSUMPTIONS IN WESTERN
STUDIES OF SIKHISM
JAMES R. LEWIS
Among Western students of the Sikh religion, it has become Commonplace to observe, directly or by implication, the supposedly baneful effects of orthodoxy on Sikh scholars studying
their own tradition. To cite one comparatively non-judgemental example:
Sikh studies in the Punjab is an expression of a
scholarship of the traditional type which is in
conformity with currently accepted orthodoxy.1
The implication in this observation is that while Western academics are free to produce truly objective scholarship, Sikh academics, regrettably, are not. I am, of course, exaggerating the point, but such over statement allows us to see the position clearly enough to be able to turn the issue around and question one of its principal assumptions- Do non-Sikh academics really bring an objective, unprejudiced perspective to their work? To anyone familiar with the contemporary ferment in such areas as hermeneutics2 , philosophy of science3 , post-structuralism4 , etc, the answer to this question must be “no”,
In the latter part of the Twentieth Century, it has been forcefully brought home to us that-despite our best efforts to be as neutral and as objective as possible—we inevitably bring certain presuppositions to the task of understanding. Thus the agenda which Sikh academics bring to their work is not inherently different (except for the fact of being more conscious, and hence, one could argue, less pernicious) than the various agendas of Western academics. 5 Examples of the kinds of interpretations imposed on Sikhs by Western observers are easier to perceive in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century accounts than in contemporary scholarship.
The clearest and certainly the most well-known example is the narrow and overtly prejudiced Christian perspective6 which Ernest Trumpp brought to his translation of the sacred scripture of the Sikhs? e.g. his comment that the Adi Granth was “perhaps the most shallow and empty book that exists, in proportion to its size.” The influence of an individual’s Christian background need not, however, always be either negative or fully conscious; e.g., the observation of Major James Browne that the Sikh religion “appears to bear the kind of relation to the Hindoo religion, which the protestant does to the Romish”.7 8 Although not an accurate opinion (Sikhs do not view themselves as reformed Hindus), Browne’s remark well demonstrates how, when a person’s intention is to record objective information (or even to pass a favourable judgement, as appears to have been part of Browne’s intent here), his or her background unconsciously shapes, and in this case distorts, his or her perception.
The focus of the present paper will be on the treatment of Sikhism by current (second half of the Twentieth Century) Western (mostly North American) scholars of religion. Their portrayals of the Sikhs are, like Browne’s, not consciously prejudicial, but (and again like Browne) their categories of analysis tend inevitably to distort as much as they reveal. These categories are, as will be seen, far more subtle than Trumpp’s or Browne’s. To uncover their structure and to demonstrate their distoring effects, I have resorted to two indirect approaches: (1) In the first part of the paper I will go over some of the earlier Sikh scholarship produced by British administrators. This examination will enable us, to gain a clearer sense of how the interest and commitments of the observer enter into the production of apparently neutral, descriptive “knowledge”. (2) In the second part of the paper, I will pick out certain specific items from contemporary scholarly discourse about Sikhs—syncretism, neo-Sikhism, and the early pacifism/later militancy distinction— and contrast them with comparable discourse about Western religious traditions. The differential deployment of these apparently neutral terms of analysis will enable us to uncover the value -judgements embedded in them.
Early British Accounts
The earliest accounts of the Sikhs by the British are, as stated above, instructive because they permit us to see how the presuppositions and interests of the observer shape his or her understanding and interpretation of phenomena. The British in India were very clearly not disinterested scholars.
They were, instead, practical men with self-conscious political interests; “Officials felt that they had to know more about Sikhs in order to deal with them.” 9 Such concerns not only set the agenda for which aspects of the Sikh phenomenon were picked out for examination, but they also shaped the interpretation of the phenomenon.
Henry T. Prinsep, for instance, wrote his origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab’10 at a time when the British were anxious about a possible Russian invasion from the Northwest, and a time when the kingdom of Ranjit Singh stood between the British and the Russians. As one might anticipate, his study of the Sikhs focussed on their political and military exploits. However, in addition to determining his choice of material, Prinsep’s political interests also caused him to interpret the Sikh religion as being “essentially political in nature” 11 ; i.e., motivation which governed Prinsep’s own activity was projected (unconsciously) into the Sikhs.
Another characteristic of early British thinking about India which we want to note is how certain interpretations became established in habitual, taken-for-granted ways of talking about India and Indians. A good example of what I mean by this is the set of interpretations which came to be expressed in the term “martial race”. What probably originated as simply a shorthand way of referring to Indian people with a history of militancy (and thus a determinant of who was recruited into the Indian army) eventually expanded to encompass a rather elaborate, pseudoscientific theory about the effects of the environment on the human species. The full-blown martial race theory was a theory of racial deterioration which claimed to take into account the effect of prolonged years of varying religions on their adherents of early marriage, of premature brides, and juvenile eroticism, of a thousand years of malaria and hook-worm, and other ills of neglected sanitation in a hot climate, and the deteriorating effect of aeons of tropical sun in races that were once white and lived in uplands and on cool steppes. 12
Thus the term “martial race,” which in the Nineteenth Century carried the sense of being a neutral, descriptive statement about an obvious fact, actually functioned as part of a racist ideology which served to help legitimate British rule of India. With respect to the Sikhs community, for example, martial race theory
served to “keep Sikhs largely out of administrative and professional jobs in Punjab which were dubbed as non-martial in character and hence unsuited to the genius of the warlike Sikhs”.13
This is not to assert, however, the British administrators consciously “invented” the theory of martial races and then cynically foisted the notion onto their unsuspecting subjects— the English generally accepted the idea as readily and unreflectively as did the Indians. (Indian communities quarreled over who should be designated as “martial”, not over the notion itself. 14 ) But rather, like Prinsep’s idea of the political nature of Sikhism, the evolution of the term— and its acquisition of ideological connotations —was shaped unconsciously by the interest and assumptions of British imperialism.
One final notion from his earlier period that I wish to examine is the civilized/savage (or civilized/primitive, civilized/ uncivilized, etcetera) distinction. Like the theory of martial races, the civilized/savage distinction appeared to have the status of a neutral fact while actually embodying part of the ideology of British imperialism. The ideological dimension of this distinction can be seen in the well-known (to students of Sikh history) remarks of John Malcolm where he explained why the English should study the Sikhs:
The most savage states are those who have the most prejudices, and who are consequently most easily conciliated or offended:
they are always pleased and flattered, when they find,
that those whom they cannot but admit to possess
superior intelligence, are acquainted with their
history.... 15
One of missing terms here is “civilised,” but its implied presence is indicated by the term “savage”; i.e., civil zed and savage are polar ideas which make sense only in opposition to one another. Other-missing terms which can be extracted by the same logic of polar concepts— are “inferior intelligence” and “least prejudices.” If we outline this implied structure, we get something like the following:
Bitish Sikhs
Civilized Savage
Superior inferior
Intelligent not intelligent
Unprejudiced prejudiced
By drawing out the implications of this short statement, we acquire enough information to get a sense of what is at stake in the civilized/savage distinction: “Civilized” and “savage” are value-judgements about superiority and inferiority rather than neutral, descriptive terms.
John Malcolm is an instructive person to examine in this regard because he is generally acknowledged to be a fair and accurate observer (Considering the limitations of his position and the early period at which he wrote) of the Sikhs. Hence it is reasonable to assume that Malcom’s reliance on such categories as civilized and savage was not intentionally malicious. Rather, these terms were part of the unquestioned framework of assumptions which Europeans, including Malcolm, brought to their interpretation of non-Europeans,
The civilized/savage distinction clearly serves to legitimate imperialism (civilised nations conquer savage nations in order to bring them the benefits of “civilization”), but the roots of this distinction spring from a deeper, unconscious source. As indicated in a wide variety of contemporary studies of various forms of prejuciice. 16 human beings have a deep-seated need to contrast themselves with “others”, and thereby to gain a clearer sense of themselves. The “others” (who may be members of a different race, a different religion, etcetera) are made to serve as mirrors on to which “we” project inverted images of ourselves (or of what we ( think we are). Thus if we place particular value on our rationality, for example, we tend to see others as irrational (e.g. the traditional Europeans distinction between the “rational” West and the “irrational” East). Like the other phenomena examined above, this tendency causes the observer to distort unconsciously the object of his or her investigation.
To recapitulate briefly, in this section we examined a few examples of early British thinking about the Sikhs in order to discover the ways in which one’s vested interest and unconscious presuppositions shape (and often warp) one’s understanding and interpretations. Our under-lying assumption was that we would be in a better position to analyze the subtle distorting influence in contemporary scholarship if we first examined the more obvious distorting influences at work in earlier scholarship. The processes and devices of discourse that we uncovered bear summary repetition because, if our assumption is correct, we should find similar factors at work in more recent scholarship.
(1) The most obvious, and probably the least available, form of distortion is introduced by focussing on only one aspect of any given phenomenon (e.g., Prinsep’s narrow focus on Sikh military-political history).
(2) More subtle forms of distortion are caused by unconscious projections, either (A) ascribing to the other one’s own thoughts and motivations (as we saw with Prinsep’s projection of political motives) or (B) perceiving the other as being precisely the opposite of oneself.
(3) Finally, we noted how certain items of discourse— certain habitual ways of analyzing an issue, and especially certain key terms (such as martial race and civilized/savage)—could acquire the status of neutral descriptions, and even be accepted as such by all involved parties, while actually embodying a particular ideology and a set of implicit value judgements.
Sikh Syncretism.
If one examines survey books (especially textbooks) on world religions and/or general works on Asian religion, one almost invariably finds that Sikhism, if mentioned at all, is usually presented as “a hybrid of two old religions, Islam and Hinduism.” 17 There are, however, some curious variations on the syncretism theme. One finds, for example, that some authors assert that Nanak “stands in a closer relation to Hinduism” 18 . while other authors assert that Nanak “leaned rather more to Islam than to Hinduism.” 19 Similarly, in opposition to writers who explain Sikhism as being “an offshoot of Hinduism”,20 one can discover writers who assert that in Sikhism “there is little doubt that the Muslim source predominates”.21 Still other authors emphasize that Sikhism, because of its syncretic character, “is not in any absolute sense new”,22 an opinion not shared by scholars who stress the originality of Guru Nanak” 23 over Sikhism’s supposed syncretism. And it would probably be possible to find many other such examples of disagreement. Thus Hindu/Muslim syncretism, which many writers on religion appear to regard as an axiomatic and “obvious” category for beginning any analysis of the Sikh religion, turns out to be extremely ambiguous, This peculiar state of affairs leads us to ask deeper kinds of questions about Sikh syncretism, such as, why has this question attracted so much attention? and, what ultimately, is at stake in this issue? .
The answers to these questions are not simple because, as it turns out, several different factors came into play here. The preeminence of syncretism interpretation is due partially to the work of certain Sikh scholars who hold to the idea for various reasons, such as the desire to demonstrate Sikhism’s inherent ecumenism- a noble ideal, undoubtably, but many of the results of this portrayal have been unfortunate. One finds, for example, that many of the authors of general surveys who rely on this characterization tended to “dismiss Sikhism as syncretism, or avoid it altogether” 24 or, when they do deal with it in a positive manner, overemphasize its syncretic character “due to the attractiveness of the syncretistic religion in a text-book on the great world religions.” 25
The principal objection to the appellation “syncretism, “however, is that within Western religions the term was traditionally used to denounce sub-groups within the religious community who were perceived as having defiled the original revelation by “grafting on foreign elements.’26 In this light, it is not unreasonable to guess that this label was probably originally applied to the Sikhs by British administrators or missionaries who wished thereby to convey the judgement that Sikhism was spurious.
To the counter-objection that in contemporary usage the term has lost its pejorative connotations, the reply should be to ask, why, then are the principal Western religions never labelled “Syncretistic”? In other words, there is nothing intrinsically objectionable in the assertion that one can find both Hindu and Islamic influences in Sikhism, as long as one acknowledges the same state of affairs in other religions. Islam for example, was shaped by Judaism, Christianity, and ancient (pre-Islamic) Arabian religion. Christianity, contains elements of Judaism, Mithraism, Hellenistic religions, and who knows what all else. Surely all of the great world faiths have been at least partially influenced by their encounter with other religions27 , In what way, then is Sikhism, and not other faiths, a “Syncretism”? Or, to ask the same question in a different way, if Islam and Christianity are not “syncretisms”, then what other term would be appropriate to describe the peculiar blend of influences at work in these religions that would be inappropriate in the case of Sikhism? The answer, it sees to me, is that any criterion for distinguishing Sikhism from other religions in this regard would have to be purely arbitrary.
The implied judgement— and here we get in the crux of the evaluative freight being carried by this apparently neutral, descriptive term— is that Sikhism can be understood as being roughly equivalent to the sum of its parts, whereas other faiths are somehow more than the sum of their parts. Or to state this more boldly, the founders of other religions were able to supply an extra (revealed? creative?) element to their final product that Guru Nanak somehow lacked. The distinction at work here is structurally similar to the civilized/savage contrast; i.e. “our” religion is revealed whereas “their” religion is a mere syncretism.
This is, of course, overstating the point, but it needs to be made perfectly clear that—with all due regard for the good intentions of present-day scholars—Sikh “Syncretism” is a holdover from an earlier period of scholarship when the various world religions were compared with Christianity in order to demonstrate Christianity’s intrinsic superiority. And the simple fact that we continue to use the term differentially (to describe Sikhism but not other religions) indicates that this judgement continues, albeit unconsciously, to be carried in our discourse.
Neo-Sikhism
Another term which one sometimes runs across in Western Sikh Scholar-ship is “neo-Sikhism”—a peculiar label which the British apparently devised for the purpose of describing the Singh Sabha reform movement. Although the term itself is used infrequently (particularly when compared with the omnipresent usage of “syncretism”), the attitude, or set of attitudes and judgements, embodied in the term are widespread enough to make an analysis of it worthwhile. Our way of proceeding will be to ask essentially the same types of questions about “neo” Sikhism that we asked about Sikh “Syncretism”.
Neo-Sikhism purports to describe a distinction between pre-Singh Sabha Sikhism and post-Singh Sabha Sikhism. Like Sikh syncretism, neo-Sikh appears to be a neutral, value-free term. If we look back at its earlier usage, however, we find. that one of the constrasting terms to “neo-Sikh” was “orthodox Sikh”.28 i.e., by implication neo—Sikhs were heterodox whereas the older Sikhism was “true” or “real” carries these judgemental connotations, we can ask, as we did with syncretism, why the “neo” label is applied unevenly across world faiths. In other words why, in the wake of Luther’s reformation, do we not call Protestants “neo-Christians”? or why are post-vatican II Catholics not labelled “neo-Catholics” (The only area in Christianity that comes to mind as a place where “neo” is employed is when it is used to designate certain schools of theology; e.g., neo-Orthodoxy and neo-Thomism.) Neo” gets applied to religious communities only when Westerners are describing other people’s religions—e.g., neo- Taoism, neoConfucianism, neo-Hinduism, etcetera— and, more often than not, the label carries the sense that “neo” religions are deviations from their true, pristine forms. There are at least two possible perspectives from which to understand why this term is attached only to “non-Western” religions.
First, the earlier Protestant assumption was that the Reformation had returned Protestants to pristine Christianity. This presupposition in turn blinded them to the revision that their own tradition had experienced, but did not prevent them from passing judgement on the changes which had taken place in other religious traditions. This structure is similar to the pattern we saw operating in our examination of syncretism; i.e., one caricatures a process which one sees in other religions while repressing awareness of the fact that the same process has occured within one’s own religion.
Second, in later periods the West conceived itself as being different from the rest of the World by virtue of (among other things) its essentially dynamic, progressive, changing character.29 By implication, other cultures were static, unchanging, or even stagnant(another example of the West projecting an inverted self-image into the rest of the world).This structure influenced the West’s perception of “non-Western” religions in a peculiar fashion: Change was natural for Western religion (Christianity) but some how unnatural when found in other faiths. Christianity is thus able to adapt to the modern world without losing its essence, but, as for a religion like that of Sikhs “much of their distinctiveness would vanish if a community like the Sikhs were to become modern in religion and social practice; and the cement that binds the community would disappear as well.’30 From this slanted perspective, Sikhs who do adapt enough to succeed in the modern world have ipso facto betrayed their faith: “Whereas for Nanak, the ultimate matter was devotion to the True Name, for the present community:, Self-preservation appears to be somewhat more important.’31
These last couple of statements, although they do not make use of the term “neo-Sikhism”, indicate that the same kind of attitude is present—an attitude which employs (though not consciously) one set of criteria for evaluating Western religions and another set of criteria for evaluating others. All religious communities attempt to remain faithful to the essence of their tradition while adapting to changing conditions, and such accommodation does not axiomatically imply either the end of community or the substitution of practical concerns for religious devotion. Here once again, beneath apparently descriptive discourse, we find a value-judgement which reveals itself as such when contrasted with the treatment of other (particularly Western) religions. .
Early Pacifism Vs. Later Militancy
The final item of discourse that I want to pull out for a comparison/ contrast type of analysis is not, as with syncretism or neo-Sikhism,a single term which embodies a covert judgement, but rather a standard observation which— when made by Western academics—is often stated in an overtly judgemental manner. The observation I refer to is the contrast between the “pacifism” of Nanak and the militancy of Gobind Singh. To extract a few items at random from world religion textbooks:
The Sikhs found themselves forced to abandon the
non-violent teaching of the early masters... 32
One of the paradoxes of the Sikh religion is its pacifism
in theory and militarism in practice: 33
Sikhism’s transformation from a passive sect to a fighting
theocray is a well nigh complete reversal of basic
values. 34
More than the pejorative judgements that we examined earlier, one is tempted to dispute these remarks at a direct, factual level (e.g.Guru Nanak’s attitude was no more “passive35 than Guru Gobind Singh’s was “violent”). Let us, however, sidestep this temptation and take the same type of approach utilized in previous sections. In this instance, the appropriate question to raise is, Are there other world religions in which the founder preached a (atleast apparently) pacifist ethic which later followers disregarded?
Out of the faiths that come immediately to mind, Jainism probably has the best record, and Buddhism’s record is uneven. However, undoubtedly the religion with the worst record of
violence is Christianity. If one were to take the words “Christians”,
“Christian”, and Christanity’s” and subtitute them for “Sikhs”,
“Sikh”, and Sikhism’s” in the above statements, the statements would be at least as accurate, and probably a good deal more accurate, than the orginals.
To the extent that an author is Christian, or at least from a Christian background, it might be possible to postulate that a kind of “guilt projection” is at work here. In other words, if one is uncomfortable with the tension/ contradiction between theory and practice in the Christian religion but refuses to face the issue squarely (and thus partially represses it), then one is likely to project that contradiction onto other religious traditions —whether or not such a tension actually exists in the other traditions. Thus the discomfort which is felt about Christianity’s self-contradiction gets displaced onto an object which had noting to do with the original problem.
The point here is not to criticize Christianity, but rather to once again point out the differential treatment which the Sikh religion has received at the hands of Western scholars; i.e., these kinds of evaluative remarks would have been less objectionable had similar criticisms been levelled against the other world faiths. The only difference between this example and the examples in the preceding sections is that here the biases are more explicit, and thus should, one would think, not have escaped the notice of conscientious academics.
The line of approach taken in this paper was basically very simple. Our principal methodological tool was comparison/ contrast. What we did was to focus on particular terms or statements, and then ask why these items of discourse were appropriate for describing Sikhism, but not appropriate when applied to Western religions. For each item we argued that, because there was no criterion for such differential usage, the deployment of such discourse signalled the presence of covert value-judgements, and in each section we attempted to articulate precisely what these judgements were.
REFERENCES
1. John CB. Webstar, “Sikh Studies in the Punjab,” in Mark Juregensmeyer & N.
Gerald Barrier, Sikh Studies (Berkeley: Graduate TheologicaI Union, 1979, p32.
2. E.g., refer to the Second major section of Hans-Georg Gadmer’s Truth and
Method (New York): Crossroad, 1975).
3. E.g. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1970).
4. E.g., the work of Michel Foucault, as in The Archaeology of knowledge (New
York: Pantheon, 1972).
5. The approach taken in this paper has been decisively shaped by Charles Long’s analysis of Western scholarship; e.g., refer to: Charles H. Long, “Human Centres: An Essay on Method in the History of Religions,” Scoundings 61(3), 1977, pp.400-414.
6. AC Arora, “Ern est Trumpp”, in Fauja Singh, ed., Historians and Historiography of the Sikhs (New Delhi: Oriental Publishers & Distributors,1978), p.155.
7. Ernest Trumpp, The Adi Granth (London: Allen & Co., 1877) p. cxxii.
8. Major James Browne, History of the Origin and Progress of the Sikhs in Ganda Singh ed. Early European Accounts of the Sikhs (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1962; 1st Pub. 1788), pp.13-14.
9. N.G. Barrier, :”Trumpp and Maculiffe: Western Students of Sikh History and
Religion,” in Fauja Singh, Op. Cit., pp. 166-167.
10. Henry T. Prinsep, Origin of the Sikh Power in Punjab (Patiala: Languages
Department, Punjab, 1970; 1st Pub. 1834).
11. Gianeshwar Khurana, British Historiography on the Sikh Power in Punjab
(New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Bangalore, Hyderabad &
Ahmedabad: Allied, 1985), p.41.
12. Sir George MacMunn, The Martial Races of India (London: Sampson Low,
Marston & Co, 1933). p.2.
13. Hakam Singh, Sikh Studies: A Classified Bibliography of Printed Books in
English (Patiala: Punjab Pub. House, 1982) p. 12.
14. T.A Heatcote, The Indian Army (New Yourk: Hippocrene, 1974) p.93.
15. John Ma1colm, “Sketch of the Sikhs” in M. Macauliffe, H.H.Wilson, Frederic
Pincott, John Malcom & Sardar Kahan Singh. The Sikh Religion: A symposium
(Calcutta: Sushil Gupta, 1958; 1st Pu’b.1810), p. 85
16. E.G., Edward. W. Said, Orientalism (New Your: Vintage, 1979), Sander L.
Gilman, Difference and Pathology (lthaca: Cornell U.Pr.1985), and Robert F.
Berkhofer, Jr., The While Man’s Indian (New York: Vintage, 1979).
17. John A Hardon, Religions of the World (Westminister, MD; Newman, 1963),
p.224,
18. D.S.Sarma, ‘The Nature and History of Hinduism,” in Kenneth We. Morgan,
ed., The Religion of the Hindus (New York: Ronald, 1933), p.41l.
19. Ninian Smart, The Religious Experience of Mankind (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1976), p. 150..
20. Niels C Nielsen, Jr., Norvin Hein, Frank E. Reynolds, Alan L. Miller, Samuel
E. Kariff, Alice C Cochran & Paul Mclean, Religions of the World (New York
: St. Martin’s, 1983), p. 383.
21. John A Hutchison, Paths of Faith (New Youk, St. Louis, San Francisco,
Toronto, London, & Sydney:McGraw-Hill, 1969), p.200.
22. John, B Noss & David S. Nose, Man’s Religions (New Youk: Macmillan, 1984),
p.221.
23. W.H. McLeod, “Sikhism,” In Geoffrey Parrinder, ed., Man and His Gods
(London, New York, Sydney, & Toronto: Hamlyn, 1971) p.212.
24. Mark Juergensmeyer, ‘’The Forgotten Tradition: Sikhism in the study of World
Religions;’in Juergensmeyer & Barrier. Op.cit., p.16.
25. Ibid., p.15.
26. Paul B. Courtright,”Syncretism and the Formation of the Sikh Tradition,” in Harbans Singh & N.Gerald Barrier, eds., Punjab Past and Present: Essays in Honour of Dr.Ganda Singh (Patiala, Punjabi V., 1976), p.417.
27. “All the living religions are complex cultural developments in which can be traced the blending of preexisting religious forms.” Herbert Stroup, Founders of living Religions (Philadephia: Westminster, 1978), p. 81.
28. N. Gerald Barrier, The Sikhs and Their Literature (Delhi: Manohar, 1970)
pp.xiiv-xiiv.
29. As has been pointed out in a number of recent studies; e.g., Said, Op. Cit.,
Berkhofer, Op.Cit., & Johannes Febian, Time and the Other (New York:
Columbia U. Pr., 1983).
30. Eugene F. Irschick, “Sikh ism as a Category for Study,”in Juergensmeyer &
Barrier. Op.cit., p. 53.
31. Robert D.Baird & Alfred Bloom, Indian and Far Eastern Religious Traditions
(New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row, 1972). p.l05.
32. Smart, Op.Cit., p.152.
33. Hardon, Op.cil., p.231
34. Hutchison, Op.cit., p. 201.
35. “The Guru, though a man of peace, was not a pacifist “John Ferguson, War
and Peace in the World’s Religions (New York, Oxford University Pr., 1978. P. 139,
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