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Gur Panth Parkash

Gur Panth Parkash
by Rattan Singh Bhangoo
Translated by
Prof Kulwant Singh

 

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Revolutionary Organization: A Study of the Ghadar Movement*

Harish K Puri

Action directed towards a revolutionary change implies organized participation. Organization, for that purpose, is generally viewed as an instrument in the strategy and thus a matter of deliberate design. It implies a rational structuring of roles and authority, for such planned action is "both possible and essential" in the considered context of the objective and subjective factors. On the other hand, organization can be viewed in non-structural terms, as a body of people with a "collective spirit," bound by loyalty and commitment to shared goals and to the revolutionary group. What importance is attached to a rational organization as part of a strategy and what shape a revolutionary organization takes are related to the character of leadership and its strategic objectives on the one hand and the ideological ethos of the movement on the other. The organization of a revolutionary movement may, thus be studied from the perspectives of its leadership and its ideological character. An attempt is made in this paper to study the organization of the Ghadar movement form 1913 to 1918 along these lines.

This aspect of the Ghadar movement has, by and large, escaped the serious attention of scholars interested in this movement. Allusions have, nevertheless, been made to its rationally planned structural and functional arrangements. References are also made to the "democratic" organization of the "Ghadar Party", its inner and outer "circles" of authority, division of roles, procedure of recruitment, rules for maintaining secrecy of decisions and activities, establishment of branches functioning under the centralized direction and so on.1 It has also been contended that the "party" was organized on the principle of "democratic centralism',2 and that its working committee was akin to the "politburo" of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.3 These assessments were based either on the selective exhortations made in its propaganda paper or the statement of a Ghadarite turned approver in the Lahore Conspiracy trials4 and the author's personal predilections and impressions. However, as it comes out form the perspectives of the leaders and the conduct of their operations, the ideological appeal was so strong that a rational organization as an instrument of strategy hardly appeared significant.

The Ghadar movement was organized on the Pacific coast of the United States of America (USA). Those who comprised it were Punjabi immigrants, mostly Sikhs, small and middle peasants at home, working as labourers in farms and factories in the USA and Canada. Many of them had served terms in the British Indian Army. Their emigration was a response to economic frustration and oppression at home. Coming to strange lands, however, they were confronted with racial hostility, fear and a sense of alienation. This "double jeopardy of oppression'5 called for action and to that end an analysis and understanding of the fundamental reasons of their oppression on the one hand and political mobilization and organization on the other. This was the task undertaken by middle class intellectuals, chief among whom was Lala Har Dayal.6 

Har Dayal had acquired, among Indians living abroad, a considerable reputation as a revolutionary intellectual. Groups of Indian immigrant labourers gathered to listen to him during May-June, 1913, when he addressed a series of meetings at various ranches and farms where they worked. In his sharp anti-British diatribe he explained to them that the basic reason for all their oppression and misery was the British rule in India. The British had rule in India. The British had ruined the country's economy, and demoralized the people. Thousands had to leave their country in search of a livelihood. In foreign lands they were hated and ridiculed. This was mainly because they were "slaves" of the British. No petitions could give the Indians their freedom and self-respect. The need was to overthrow the British rule through an armed revolt. The British could have been easily removed in 1857 itself  had the Sikhs not supported the British then. Now if the brave Sikhs were ready to join the revolt, the British could be expelled in no time.7 Inspired by the warm response from his audience, he declared at a meeting held at Astoria (June, 1913) that a revolution would occur in India within ten years.8

Har Dayal was however, mainly a "man of words"; propaganda, oral and written, was his forte, and as for "practical work", he confessed and year later, he was "unsuited."9 So when issues like "what is to be done?" and "where to begin?" were raised, his natural answer was to start with a propaganda paper for the political education of the people, particularly of Indians settled in foreign lands. The paper's name was to be the Ghadar, to be published in Urdu and Punjabi, and its editor, Har Dayal. Now funds had to be collected and other arrangements made for the purpose. An organization was set up with a working committee of dedicated workers taking one member from each of the main centres where Indian labourers worked. It was named Hindi Association of the Pacific Coast. Har Dayal called it "Hindu Association." Sohan Singh Bhakna was chosen its president, Har Dayal, its secretary, and Kanshi Ram, the treasurer. It is also claimed that a "secret" commission was also constituted consisting of the three top leaders-Bhakna, Har Dayal and Kanshi Ram.10 Soon afterwards the association came to be known as the "Ghadar Party" after the name of its propaganda paper launched on 1 November 1913.

Publication and distribution of this weekly was the central purpose of the committee. In an interview with the Bulletin of san Francisco on 26 March 1914, Har Dayal (he left USA on 14 April and with that ended his stewardship of the movement) made a categorical assertion that the "Hindu Association" was established for the purpose of carrying on oral and written propaganda against the British rulers of India. There was the need for continuing political education of Indians "for a long time".11 He believed that the role of Mazzini must come first: "after Mazzini, Garibaldi; after Garibaldi, Cavour. Even so it must be with us. Virtue and Wisdom first, then war; finally independence."12 Revolution was a proposition of a distant future. He did not think that organization was a necessary element in the strategy for revolution. It could as well be a "spontaneous revolution."13 In short, organizing for a revolution was not on the agenda right then.

However, the Ghadar did not make a fine distinction between political education and a call for rebellion. The first issue announced: "………. today there begins in foreign lands…a war against English rule…..a cannonade with the strength of a pen, and the time is soon to come when rifle and blood will be used for pen and ink." In a leading article, "Our Name and Our Work are Identical", it was made clear that the plan was of an armed rebellion on the pattern of the waged by Indians in 1857. Statistics of India's poverty and the draining of India's wealth to England were given and the British rule characterized as an "ulcer" and a "plague" on the nation. Indians were called upon to come forward to serve the motherland with tan, man dhan (body, mind and money); to preserve the honour of their forefathers-Singhs, Khans, and Rajputs. "So my last word to you is." Har Dayal exhorted his readers, "rise; gird up your loins. Rise; gird up your loins. Rise. This is not the time to delay."14

 

Surely, revolution was not the programme immediately. The suitable time would be the expected big war between Britain and Germany; Germans, it was given out, would help the people of India. There was already a revolt against the British in Egypt and Ireland. The British, in the coming war, would be engaged by a number of other forces. Reference was also made to revolutionary activities within India and outside. It was believed that "nemesis is at the heels of England". A contribution to the Ghadar, sent from Switzerland in the beginning of August, was entitled "Two Things are Necessary." These were "Ghadar and Guns."15

A more potent weapon in the armoury of the Ghadar however, was raw and passionate poetry of revolt regularly published in the weekly, under the title of "Ghadar di Goonj" (Echo of Ghadar).16 Straight and sharp expression of their feelings of "shame" and "outrageous disgrace" in foreign lands and of "a weariness of the heart" that the British had robbed them of their honour was the major burden. Conjuring up "the spirits of the past to their service" the poets invoked the injunctions of the tenth Sikh Guru and recalled the battles, the valour and sacrifices of the heroes. This powerful language of communication appeared to validate a hypothesis of Diaz about the Andalusian peasant rebellions that "illiteracy of the audience is no insuperable obstacle", provided the idiom fits into their cognitive maps.17 

Groups of dedicated Indians worked, practically free of charge, writing, printing, and distributing the paper and preaching among their fellowmen. The Ghadar was distributed widely among Indians settled in various parts of the world, particularly among those living in America, Canada, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Manila, Penang and Singapore. It was read at Sikh congregations at the Gurdwaras and its teachings circulated "with deadly effect among Sikh immigrants."18 Among them were soldiers  of the 26th Punjabi Regiment then stationed in Hong Kong. As the propaganda of the Ghadar . It started winning adherents and securing generous contributions.  The rising strength of spontaneous support became the chief measure of the success of their efforts for a revolution. Conversely the needs of "methodical element" and organizing for rebellion were pushed to the background.

Some of the Indian students in California, however, appeared to carry ideas of a simultaneous organizational effort for purposes of launching a revolution which, they thought, was patently their task as against that of the immigrant labourers. They were "the only intellectuals….. with whom Lala Har Dayal could discuss planning for achieving India's independence ….Lala Har Dayal inspired us by his eloquence…Lahiri (Jatinder Nath) had the practical experience to organize."19

Lahiri proposed to organize the struggle on the pattern of secret terrorist organizations like the Anushilan and Jugantar Samities. Strict rules were laid down for the recruitment of members; vows of secrecy and celibacy were strictly observed and provision was made for the training of members in boxing, wrestling. Fencing, shooting and manufacture of explosives.20 Lahiri's own account, however, does not indicate any assumption of organizational roles by him. His interest lay in training in boxing, fencing and so on, and not in organizing for a revolutionary struggle.21 Pandurang Sadashiv khankhoje, another of the young "intellectuals" alludes to a rational division of roles in the Ghadar "party", one was the "Propaganda wing" controlled by Har Dayal and the other was an 'action wing" controlled by Khankhoje himself.22 Gobind Behari Lal thought  that he was one of the three who constituted the nucleus of the Ghadar organization.23 

For a short time in the beginning, a handful of these petit bourgeois radicals who had been associated with Har Dayal carried notions of their organizing skills. They were different from the immigrant Punjabi Labourers both in their social and political consciousness and the conceptions of a revolutionary struggle. Whereas the educated elements viewed revolutionary enterprise in terms of secret organizations and terroristic activities, the immigrants coming from the peasant stock viewed it mainly as an enterprise of valour and sacrifice in an open combat. Further, whereas the former treated the volatile and precipitate Punjabis as a "crowd of rustics," with a certain cavalier attitude, the latter looked upon these "Babus", as soft spoken and timid, with suspicion.24 Formalism and secrecy signified cowardice to those who were prepared to lay down their for their cause.

There was thus an "uneasy coalition of the two distinct elements in the Ghadar movement.25 However, the "intellectuals" sensed the temper of the audacious Punjabi immigrants and the difficulty in "utilizing" them for their designs of revolutionary work. There is no evidence that they insisted on priority for organization, and "the Sikhs came forward mostly and the movement was practically theirs."26

Harcharan Das, who turned an approver and a prosecution witness at the San Francisco conspiracy trial, stated that a set of 17 rules had been framed for what he called the "Yugantar Asharm Group." Giles T Brown refers to it as the "inner circle" and says, "Har Dayal hoped to control activities of the larger association."27 Doubts about the authenticity of this version apart,28 the activities of the Yugantar Ashram group related mainly to propaganda.

The leadership had not yet formulated its strategy for a revolutionary struggle. But the Ghadar made frequent reference to some methods and tactics which could be employed. These were evidently in the nature of ad hoc loud thinking. In its very first issue, the Ghadar suggested an uprising on the pattern of the one of 1857. Indian soldiers of the British Indian Army were to be roused and won over and so too the common people. Arms had to be captured from military arsenals. An analysis of the objective conditions was not made. On the other hand, such other exhortations were also simultaneously made as reflected a fascination for terroristic exploits.

Har Dayal's article "Philosophy of the Bomb" commended the terrorist heroes and their deeds. His exultation over the bomb thrown at the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, in December 1912 is well known. The Ghadarites were asked to "shine like the Bengalees….join the Bengalees …and set up secret societies. It is necessary to deal first with the traitors of the nation and then ride on the chest of the enemies ….The first task is of killing the whites, the rest will be seen later."29

Whereas the leading figures conceived of the revolutionary struggle as a broad-based popular armed uprising, the cues relating to methods spread by Ghadar - the only effective channel of communication and the only reliable repository of their thinking- left the issues considerably vague and open. The Ghadar, unlike the Iskra in the hands of Lenin, was conceived only as a propaganda paper and not as an organizer:  The Bolsheviks had given a high priority to the structuring of unified militant organization as an instrument of strategy and so the Iskra could be used as a powerful organizer. The Ghadar leadership had neither cared to plan its strategy nor thought of organization as its essential instrument. Perhaps the leaders felt that it was a matter for future consideration. Meanwhile, the Ghadar became a powerful medium for rallying large numbers to the cause of armed rebellion. They were mesmerized by their own propaganda and its success in winning adherents became a further force for bypassing the needs of organization.

When the prospects of war between Britain and Germany appeared on the scene, in the last week of July 1914, the "great opportunity" generated a restlessness for immediate action. The Ghadar of 28 July 1914 called upon its adherents to start a "rebellion in India, as soon a the war breaks out in Europe." On 4 August, the Ghadar, in an article entitled "The Trumpet of War," gave a call to arms: "O' 'warriors'! the opportunity that you have been looking for has come… Don't delay a moment …This is the right moment to start a war of independence. You can very soon expel the British form India."

Evidently the need of a considered and carefully formulated plan of action and even a rudimentary organization for launching an armed revolt against the foremost imperial power of the time escaped the attention of those who assumed leadership roles. Enthusiastic patriots fanned out to various settlements of Indian immigrants in Canada and USA exhorting their compatriots to return to their motherland "at once." Some of them had started enlisting the people soon after the Komagata Maur had left the Canadian waters on 23 July.30 Special gatherings were held at Oxnard, Upland, Fresno, Los Angeles, Astoria, Clairmont, followed by a big one at Sacramento on 11 August. Bhagwan Singh, Mohaemmad Barkatullah and Ram Chandra addressed these gatherings. The Portland Telegram of 7 August flashed the news: "Hindus Go Home to Fight in Revolution". Ship after ship carried groups of highly surcharged revolutionaries to the shores of India.

But what exactly were they to do on reaching home? Prithvi Singh Azad recalls that every one present at the gathering at Sacramento sensed a crusading fire in everybody around, but none had any clear notion in his mind of the nature or content of the revolutionary programmes.31 The Ghadar of 4th August had given instructions: "Go to India and incite the native troops. Preach mutiny openly. Take arms from the troops of the native states and wherever you see the British, kill them. If you do your work quickly and intelligently, there is hope that Germany will help you. Get help from Nepal and Afghanistan. Start the War quick. Don't delay." Aboard the ships, these revolutionaries organized themselves into small bands under appointed leaders, took oaths of solidarity, made preliminary plans of their activities, sang revolutionary songs and in the port towns of Manila, Hong Kong, Penang, Singapore, Rangoon went out openly preaching rebellion and persuading Indians to join the crusade.32 When the first two ships, Tosha Maru and Mashima Maru, were detained by the British Resident at Penang, some of them seriously thought of starting the revolt there itself.33

Hundreds of them were arrested on arrival at Indian ports, including some prominent leaders like Sohan Singh Bhakna, Jwala Singh, Wasakha Singh, Udham Singh Kasel and Jagat Ram. A total of 704 were restricted to their villages.34 But the most eminent leaders like Bhagwan Singh, Santokh Singh, Balwant Singh, Barkatullah and Ram Chandra had stayed back in California hoping to develop collaboration with the Germans.

Without a centralized leadership or a headquarter, and devoid of support from the general public, bands of Ghadarites carried on ad hoc efforts to collect arms, raise funds through armed dacoities, go to the barracks to win over soldiers, manufacture hand made bombs, and so on35 until rash Bihari Bose effected some sort of coordination of activities. The launching of revolt was bound to be affected by organizational weaknesses. The uprising planned for 19 February ended in a tragic fiasco. But the dauntless courage of these patriots and the staggering sacrifices made by them became a perennial source of inspiration to the Punjabis in all their future struggles for freedom and justice. The perspectives of the leadership about revolutionary strategy, their conception of their own roles, the emergent pattern of authority, the way the members were recruited and the manner in which coordination of efforts was sought to be achieved, all point to a high premium on spontaneity and a pre-organizational effort.

When the Hindi Association was formed, the object was clear: to prepare for an armed revolt in India. As to what was to be done, propaganda for political education was the paramount concern. The band of dedicated leading men of the community, called the "working committee", was concerned mainly with publication and distribution of the paper and mobilizing people for rebellion. Though Har Dayal thought that armed revolt was a future proposition he was not sure if that necessarily called for a different type of revolutionary organization for it could as well be a spontaneous uprising. He neither considered it necessary to make an analysis of the objective conditions and the subjective element or the possible strategy for revolt, nor did he make his prominent comrades aware of the urgency or importance of organization as an instrument of strategy.

Sohan Singh Bhakna contends that the "working committee" constituted in May 1913 was a collective decision making body for all matters and that to take decisions on top secret and important financial matters, an inner circle of three leaders, Bhakna, Har Dayal and Kanshi Ram, which he calls the "secret commission", was constituted. According to him these bodies were democratically elected and had a one year term of office.36 There is however no mention in the 'Ghadar' of any formal meetings of these bodies or of the decisions made therein, nor is any other evidence available to corroborate it. On the contrary, very important decisions, like the ones relating to the change of the editor of Ghadar after Har Dayal's departure and the appointment of the new Secretary in his place appear to have been made informally.

What is more striking about the absence of specific and formal role allocation is the fact that whereas, by all available evidence Ram Chandra became the editor of the Ghadar in March-April, 1914, and remained in charge of the finances and a major man of authority until his death in 1917, Sohan Singh Bhakna, who was then the president and also as he claimed, the chairman of the so-called " secret commission", believed that Harnam Singh Tundijat  was made the editor and Santokh the secretary after Har Dayal.37 The statements of Ghadarites in the conspiracy trials also indicate that they had very conflicting notions about who were the office bearers and which ones held what positions.38 Whereas it is given out that when Bhagwan Singh and Barkatullah arrived at San Francisco from Hong Kong and Japan in May 1914 they were appointed president and vice-president of the Association respectively, it has however not been possible to find evidence of any formal meeting of the general body or the working committee to hold fresh elections.

Available evidence does not suggest the existence of an identifiable formal decision-making centre of authority. Ram Chandra was the one who stayed permanently at the Yugantar Ashram, the party headquarters and the Berlin Committee regarded him as the chief leader of the Ghadar Party for purposes of coordinating revolutionary activity. Most other prominent leaders however did not consider that he had any legitimate authority. The movements of and the roles assumed by a number of leading figures like Bhagwan Singh, Barkatullah, Harnam Singh Kahri, Sohan Lal Pathak indicate that they could act almost autonomously or by informal and ad hoc allocation of duties. The authority of particular leaders was based in practice, not upon their formally allocated roles but on the respect which they enjoyed among separate groups. To many the only source of direction was the 'Ghadar'.

How was then a division of roles effected? How was discipline maintained among the rank and file? According to Sohan Singh Bhakna, each member worked according to his sense of duty everywhere because the members had come to fully under-stand their duties. This was "not a discipline of the rod but of sense".39 Organization, apparently, was not a priority, for the 'Ghadar' of 4 April 1915, acclaimed without reservation, the spontaneous and pre-organizational character of the "party" thus: "The People of this party cannot make the usual arrangements for organization, register, house etc. outside the country they wander thirsting, starving, clad in rags but filled with great enthusiasm. Such is the sacred Hindustan Ghadar Party, which though without any particular centre, has its soldiers ready everywhere and at every time."40

The accent being on heroism, planning and coordination of effort under a unified command appeared less significant. Sachidra Nath Sanyal, who came to the Punjab to make an assessment of the situation on behalf of Rash Bihari Bose, relates an incident which points up the fact that the Ghadar movement did not possess a recognized hierarchy of leadership. At a meeting with some of the important Ghadar leaders, he expressed his desire to talk to their chief. Amar Singh told him frankly, "To tell you the truth, we do not have a real leader, that is why we need Rash Bihari Bose". Kartar Singh Sarabha substantially agreed with Amar Singh but turned to assure him, "Look brother, why are you getting so despondent? When the time comes you will see how many hidden heroes emerge out of us."41 The incident points as much to the felt absence of a collective organization under one chief as to the persistent belief in the strength of spontaneity and that heroism is after all the main consideration in a revolutionary struggle. "Our leaders were our sentiments", says Prithvi Singh Azad with a hindsight.42

How were the participants in the proposed revolt recruited? "The 'Ghadar' gave an open call to all Indians", says one leader, "and all those who felt the same way became our comrades".43 Prithvi Singh Azad, another important Ghadarite was equally unambiguous in his reply: "All those who wanted to joined."44 "All such Indians as appeared to be ready to work for the Ghadar cause were taken as comrades. According to some of the Ghadarites the primary test of a particular individual's bonafides was his expressed passion for the cause.

Did they prepare any list of their members or participants? No. Amar Singh told the court that soon after the Komagata Maru left the Canadian waters, he went out persuading his compatriots in British Columbia to leave for India to participate in the rebellion. All the passengers of the Komagata Maru were regarded as fellow Ghadarites. Wherever the home bound ships stopped in ports, the leading Ghadarmen went out and collected small numbers of Indians to accompany them to India. "Only cowards would remain behind"45 proclaimed the Ghadar. Those who prevaricated or hesitated were ridiculed. At one of the gatherings at Manila one lady. Gulab Kaur, took off her bangles and offered them to the hesitant ones.46

Arriving in India Ghadarmen were instructed to move to their villages to enlist rebels. "I was asked to go to Doaba and bring any men I knew", Jawand Singh reported at his trial in the fourth Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case.47

Was there not a possibility of men of doubtful intentions joining the Ghadar fathas? Ghajjar Singh Bhakna admitted there was such a possibility, "but that was not the time for us for a scrutiny. All those who felt for the country had to be collected".48

 

Groups of Ghadarites came from a number of different centres. These centres were called branches. The 'Ghadar' exhorted the readers to set up branches. There were however no instructions given about the purpose, function or shape of their organization. Sohan Singh Bhakna claimed 72 branches were set up in the USA alone.49 A branch actually meant a group of people influenced by the teachings of the Ghadar.

How were these "branches" constituted? "The Ghadar spread the ideas. The people formed small fraternal groups and these, of their own accord, started taking organizational shapes", tells one leader.50 "Branches sprang up spontaneously in Panama, Mexico and China", writes Harjap Singh.51 The idea of creating a rational organization and forging links between the various branches and with the central leadership or authority for purposes of a unified command and control were not considered significant. The California State Senate Committee on Un-American Activities discovered that "each of the Ghadar parties throughout the world was purely autonomous, there being no organizational contact between them. The contacts between these groups in the United States were informal and indirect."52

The operations of Ghadarites while working for a revolt in India reflected more or less autonomous and separate group activity. Before the arrival of Rash Bihari Bose in January 1915, these separate groups called jathas (gangs or bands and known after one or other leader such as Nidhan Singh's jatha, Nawab Khan's jatha or Gujjar Singh's jatha made more or less independent plans and announced their separate dates of starting the rebellion.

The main channel of communication between these groups in distant places and the leaders at San Francisco was the Ghadar. Often one or other leading figure moved form one place to another preaching the cause and giving instructions. However, as it comes out in the statements in the conspiracy trials, the roving activists functioned more or less autonomously in the absence of a central plan or central command. The pattern remaining, by and large, similar even at the time when armed uprising was to be launched, the facility which self appointed communicator enjoyed could lead to unspecific and even conflicting directions. This was part of the reason for separate dates of the rising and other exploits sometimes just to "fill the time' until the stipulated uprising.

The Ghadar movement was Janus-faced. It reflected, on the one hand, a revolutionary potential and a resemblance to traditional peasant revolts on the other. Its constituents, the peasants from Punjab, influenced by a vastly different environment they confronted in foreign lands, and by broader socio-political ideas, developed progressive orientations. This in fact was a major factor which alienated them from their compatriots at home. But their values and patterns of collective activity remained traditional.

Leadership, in such situations, is a crucial variable. If it is of a traditional peasant character, the flexibility on the organizational plane leaves things to be tackled by actors according to their environment and their resources. What then holds them together is an emotional commitment to common goals and to one another. The rebel is prepared to prove his loyalty by laying down his life. There follows a "worship of spontaneity."

Spontaneity, however, is "nothing more or less than consciousness in an embryonic from," A leadership with a high level of revolutionary consciousness and organizational skill may succeed in transforming the spontaneous element into a rationally organized movement for planned political tasks. In the absence of organizational skills, the success which powerful ideological appeal and mobilization skills seems to ensure, tends to provide strong rationalization for by passing the difficult but nevertheless crucial task of "confronting reality with reason." That in fact is one of the major reasons for the tragic failure of many a revolutionary movement.

~~~
                                                                                       
References

   1. See for instance R C Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India, Calcutta, K L Mukhopadhyaya. 1963, Vol II, pp 387-389, LP Mathur, Indian Revolutionary movement in the United States of America, S Chadn and Co New Delhi 1970, pp 54-61; Randhir Singh, Ghadar Heroes, People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1945, p 809, G S Deol, The Role of the Ghadar Party in the National Movement, Sterling, Delhi, 1969, pp 59-60; AC Bose, Indian Revolutionaries Abroad, Bharati Bhawan, Patna, 1971 p 60; Giles T Brown, The Hindu Conspiracy and the Neutrality of the United States 1914-17, M A Thesis, (unpublished)  university of California, Berkeley 1914, p 7; Dharam Vira, Lala Har Dayal and Revolutionary Movement of  his Times, Indian Book Co, New Delhi, 1970, p 196.

2. Sohan Singh Josh, Baba Sohan Singh Bhakna: The Life of the founder of the Ghadar party, peoples Publishing House, New Delhi, 1970, p 27.

3. Sohan Singh Bhakna's speech at the All India Revolutionaries Conference at Jullundur on 17 September 1967. Proceeding of the conference in the People's Path October 1967.

4. Statement of Harcharan Das in United States of American versus Fraz Bopp, U S Department of Justice Records, also in Second Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case, Hom Dept (Pol) B, May 1917, proceedings 342-43, File pp 150-51. This statement cited in detail by Giles T Brown in his M A Thesis became a major source for these formulations by some of the above mentioned authors.

5.  Mark Juergensmeyer, "The Ghadar Syndrome: Nationalism in an Immigrant Community", Punjab Journal of Politics, Vol I, No, I, P I.

6. Others included Taraknath Das, Guru Dutt Kumar, Harnam Singh Kahri, P S Khankhoje, G B Lal, Darisi Chenchiah, Bhai parmanand and Mohammed Barkatullab.

7. Report of W C Hopkinson, Home Department (Pol) B November 1913, proceedings 62-66. Also Harnam Singh "Tundilat", "Ghadar Party Ka Ithas" (unpublished).

8. Report of the British Consul at Portland, Home Department (Pol) B. November 1913, proceedings 62-63.

9. His letter to German Consul-General in Geneva, cited in Emily C Brown, Har Dayal: Hindu Revolutionary and Rationalist, University of Arizona Press, Tuscon, 1975. P 187.  

10. Sohan Singh Bhakna, 'Jeewan Sangram', Yuvak Kendar Prakashan, Jullundur, 1967, pp 43-44. Dharma Vira calls it the "Finance Committee", op cit, p 186.

11. Emily Brown, op cit; p 159.

12. Bande Mataram, Geneve, 10 September, 1909. Excerpts in J C Ker, Political Trouble in India 1907-1917, Oriental Publishers, Delhi, 1973 (reprint), p 113. 

13. Emily Brown, op cit, p 113.

14. Ghadar, 1 November 1913, true translation in Home Department (Pol) A January 1914 proceedings 42-43.

15. Ghadar, 11 August, 1914. See Brown, op cit. p 128.

16. The first volume of these poems (pp 28) was published in April 1914 by the Ghadar Press, San Francisco.

17. Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, New, Jersey 1970, p 226.

18. Emily Brown, op cit, p 147. 

19. Drisi Chenchiah, "The Ghadar Party 1913-18: An Arhealic Report," 1956 (unpublished), Part III, pp 13 and 16-17.  Chenchiah was a student of agricultural sciences and had joined the Ghadar movement. 

20. Ibid.

21. Uma Mukherjee, Two Great Indian Revolutionaries, K L Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1966, p 65.

22. Bhupendranath Dutt, Aprakashit Rajnitik Ithas, Nav Bharat Publishers, Calcutta, 1953, Appendix V

23. Emily Brown, op cit, p 140.

24. Khushwant Singh and Satindra Singh observe that "the Sikhs looked down upon the 'Hindu' as English knowing 'babus' and expected them to do as they were told. The Hindus treated the Sikhs with contempt as a lawyer treats his rustic client from whom he draws money", Ghadar 1915, R and k Publishing House, New Delhi, 1966, p 16.

25. Emily Brown, op cit, p 140.

26. Chenchiah, op cit., Part II, p 14.

27. Giles T Brown, op cit, p 7

28. Harcharan Das reportedly moved to San Francisco from Canada only after September 1914 when the main body of Ghadarites had already left for India. The fact that he gave the statement as an approver and that this could not be corroborated from other available evidence raised doubts about its authenticity.

29. Ghadar di Goonj, pp 4 and 16.

30. Statement of Amar Singh in Lahore Conspiracy Case, Home Department (Pol) A October 1915, Proceedings 91. File pp 62-63.

31. Prithvi Singh Azad, Kranti path Ka Pathik, Pragya prakashan, Chandigarh, 1964, p 81.

32. Nawab Khan's statement, Lahore Conspiracy Case, Home department (Pol) Secret, October 1915, proceedings 206-238.

33. Jagjit Singh, Ghadar party Lehar, Tarn Taran, 1955, pp 321-22

34. The Lt. Governor of Punjab reported that out of 3125 returned immigrants who passed through the hands of the police at Calcutta and Ludhiana upto end of February 1915, 189 had been interned and 704 restricted to their villages, sedition Committee Report (1918) New Age Publishers (reprint) Calcutta, 1973, p. 155.  

35. For details see Harish K Puri, Ghadar Party: A Study in Militant Nationalism, Ph D Thesis, Guru Nanak Dev University, 1975, pp 251-52

36. Bhakna, op cit p 40

37. Ibid, p 48.

38. See for instance the statements of Amar Singh, Jagat Singh, Mula Singh, Inde, Singh and Nawab Khan in the Lahore Conspiracy Case, Home Department (Pol) Ar October 1915, proceeding No, 91.
39. Ibid, p 45.
40. See true translation in Home Department (pol) secret, October 1915, proceedings 206-238, Appendix II.
41. Sachindra Nath Sangyal, Bandi Jeewan, Atam Ram and Sons, Delhi 1963, p 20.
42. Prithiv Singh Azad in his interview with the author, tape recorded.
43. Gujjar Sing Bhakna, in his interview with the author, tape recorded.
44. Prithvi Singh Azad, interview.
45. Ghadar Di Goonj, Vol I p 20.
46. See Gurcharan Singh Sainsara, "A Sikh Heroine of the Ghadar Party, Gulab Kaur" Journal of Sikh Studies, Amritsar, Vol IV No 2 pp 93-98.
47. Crown Vs Jawand Singh, Fourth Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case, Home Department (Pol) A September 1918, proceedings 55-57.
48. Gujjar Singh Bhakna, interview.
49. Sohan Singh Bhakna, op cit.
50. Prithivi Singh Azad, Interview.                                                    
51. Harjap Singh, Meri Pardes Yatra, unpublished.
52. The senate fact Finding Committee of California State, 7th Report on Un-American Activities in the State of California, San Francisco, 1953, p 216.

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